Although accountability systems are established to ensure organizational adherence to financial and ethical standards for nonprofit organizations, the reality of whether such standards make a difference to donors has not been measured. This article discusses the current landscape of accountability systems and accountability ratings and describes a model for estimating the effect of ratings systems on donor behavior within the theoretical context of information asymmetry. Hypotheses are tested with nonprofit ratings for New York charities from the Better Business Bureau's Wise Giving Alliance to estimate the effect of accountability ratings on the amount of contributions an organization receives. Results indicate that the Wise Giving Alliance "pass" ratings have a statistically significant effect on the contributions received; however, "did not pass" ratings are nonsignificant. The study is important for academics as well as practitioners who are monitoring time and money spent on accountability issues.
W e want our nonprofit organizations to do good and to be good. Although accountability systems are established to ensure organizational adherence to financial and ethical standards for nonprofit organizations, the reality of whether such standards make a difference to donors has not been explicitly measured.
Accountability is necessary to promote public trust in the third sector. Although state regulations monitor fiscal policy and practices in conjunction with the laws of the state, many watchdog organizations and nonprofits themselves feel that these state regulations fall short of the need for accountability. After calls in the 1980s and 1990s for greater accountability in the nonprofit sector as evidenced by legislative hearings, multiple organizations created their own standards or voluntarily adopted those already established by another organization. Early accountability standards concentrated on financial and fund-raising best practices; however, these early models have expanded in recent years to encompass all areas of institutional governance. Along with suggesting or promoting guidelines for accountability in an effort to alleviate information asymmetry, 1 or varying levels of information between organizations and their individual target groups, some organizations such as the Better Business Bureau (BBB), Ministry Watch, the Maryland Association of Nonprofit Organizations, and other watchdog nonprofits have instituted ratings systems that are available to the public, along with extensive reports on individual charities. The ratings provide easier outside scrutiny of an organization over a range of disclosures and best practices. Such ratings are the subject of this study.
Toward the end of understanding how such ratings affect nonprofits, this article discusses the current landscape of accountability systems and accountability ratings and the scholarly work in the subject and, finally, describes a model for estimating the effect of ratings systems on donor behavior. Some scholars agree that accountability measures are necessary and greater accountability is required (Moore, 2001 ); however, we have failed to statistically measure whether or not such mechanisms influence a donor's decision to give. This study fills this void in the literature and informs the decisions of academics and nonprofit managers.
Literature Review
The issue of accountability has received broad attention. Although most scholars in the field recognize the need for and promote the use of accountability systems (Brody, 2002; Gronbjerg, 1993; Salamon, 1999 Salamon, , 2002 Salamon, , 2003 Weisbrod, 1977) , some have focused specifically on the effectiveness of nonprofit accountability systems (Bennett & DiLorenzo, 1994; Bies, 2001; Edwards & Hulme, 1996; Kanter & Summers, 1987; Murray, 2001 ), yet none to date has systematically pursued the effect of accountability ratings on organizations or their donors. Although accountability has been defined in a variety of ways, within this context of ratings systems, the definition of accountability relies on the boundaries established under these systems. For example, accountability means meeting the requirements set forward by ratings organizations within the categories of financial transparency, human resources equity, open disclosure in marketing and fund-raising publications, and so on. As such, this accountability definition incorporates the tendencies of ratings systems to combine both general management practices (e.g., specifying how often boards should meet and their recommended composition) and disclosure activities (e.g., requiring an annual report available for public review). Therefore, this definition complements but is not limited to more formal definitions of accountability, which include the process of financial reporting, aligning mission with resources or managing resources in a way to optimize performance.
Accountability in terms of federal and state regulatory compliance has been examined (Irvin, 2005; Peters, 2001 ) and criticized for focusing too intently on adhering to accountability measures regardless of programmatic outcomes, whereas other academics and practitioners offer prescription for governmental oversight (Moore, 2001) or greater nonprofit autonomy (Biggs & Neame, 1996) . On a broader scope, other scholars have examined the accountability landscape of entire countries, including Ireland (Hayes, 1996) , Bombay (Desai & Howes, 1996) , Bangladesh (Karim, 1996) , Africa (Anheier, 1987; Gariyo, 1996) , Latin America (Bejar & Oakley, 1996) , Europe, and Central America (Biekart, 1996) . Bennett and DiLorenzo (1994) provide an empirical study of effectiveness of accountability measures in their study of the health care industry. After scrutinizing the "Big Three" medical research and health promotion charities-the American Cancer Society, the American Heart Association, and the American Lung Associationthe authors conclude that accountability standards within the health care industry are ineffective. After discussing donors' decisions to give to health care charities, the authors turn to ratings systems by two watchdog agencies-the National Charities Information Bureau (NCIB) and the Philanthropic Advisory Service (renamed the Wise Giving Alliance) of the BBB-stating, "Neither auditors nor rating services have uncovered malfeasance in the past. . . . Clearly, something is amiss" (Bennett & DiLorenzo, 1994, p. 222) . What do the authors recommend as a cure to this ill? In part, they recommend greater flow of information to the public with regard to a charity's activities. Information asymmetry between donors and organizations will provide the basis for the hypotheses presented in this article.
Current Accountability Ratings
As normative frameworks, ratings systems are designed to influence the behavior of nonprofit managers and their organizations. By conforming to standards or best practices recommended by rating organizations, a nonprofit signals to donors, board members, and other target groups its professionalism and responsibility in carrying forward its service or activity in accordance with public trust. To the extent that such standards are coercive, organizations may respond within the spirit of the standards, that is, for the betterment of the organizations and its target groups, or outside the spirit of the standards, providing the appearance of conformity without genuinely disclosing information or altering an organization's operations accordingly. However, accountability recommendations and ratings systems in particular generally engender positive and admirable efforts on behalf of nonprofits to communicate honestly and effectively with the public and manage responsibly.
According to a 2001 Wise Giving Alliance survey of 2,003 adult Americans conducted by Princeton Survey Research Associates, donors prefer to get information from charities directly, followed by friends and family, and then watchdog organizations.
2 Although charities, families, and friends all convey specific biases in their information, ideally, watchdog organizations provide unbiased, objective information concerning an organization. Recommendations for organizations seeking to convey greater accountability abound from watchdog groups, professional organizations, and concerned agencies. The Independent Sector's (2008) clearinghouse of accountability standards compiles close to 100 codes and standards governing (a) public charities, (b) foundations, (c) professional practices and standards for individuals, (d) standards for online giving, (e) standards for gift-in-kind, and (f) marketing guidelines. Even so, organizations of external review are few with most nonprofits left to their own self-regulation; however, the BBB's Wise Giving Alliance, American Institute of Philanthropy, Charity Navigator, and Ministry Watch offer an external review process resulting in a rating or ranking of the charities they analyze.
3 These external organizations rate institutions according to varying criteria concerning governance, fund-raising, human resources, informational transparency, and others and, in so doing, establish a set of best practices and disclosure activities toward which an organization should purportedly strive. In addition, some nonprofit watchdog groups provide standards and accountability grades to nonprofits within specific geographic borders, such as the Maryland Association of Nonprofits.
The underlying theme of such ratings systems is that of helping donors make well-informed decisions about where to place their giving power. For example, the Wise Giving Alliance (2007) states, "The BBB Wise Giving Alliance offers guidance to donors on making informed giving decisions through our charity evaluations"; Charity Navigator's (2007) self-avowed purpose is "to advance a more efficient and responsive philanthropic marketplace 4 by evaluating the financial health of America's largest charities"; Ministry Watch (2007) calls itself "a place where you can learn about how to be a 'responsible giver'"; and the American Institute of Philanthropy (2007) refers to itself as "a nationally prominent charity watchdog service whose purpose is to help donors make informed giving decisions."
Ironically, in some academic articles, the effects of accountability on donor behavior are viewed as somewhat incidental to the issue. For example, in Hayes's (1996) study, donors' response to accountability is listed under the category of "perceived advantages of accountability." In other words, organizations believe that accountability matters to donors, but they are not certain. Such uncertainty results from the fact that organizations have incomplete information about donor behavior, and at the reverse end of the spectrum, donors have incomplete information about organizations.
Incomplete information on the part of the donor translates into information asymmetry where nonprofit organizations gain a strategic advantage over donors by withholding negative information and publicizing positive ratings and other information such as "feel good" stories about their organization. 5 The Wise Giving Alliance study addresses this phenomenon, citing that inability to access relevant information limits people's ability to distinguish charities that deserve their support from those that do not. Seven in 10 adults (70%) say it is difficult to know whether or not a charity asking for their support is legitimate. . . . People's main source of information to help make giving decisions are the charities themselves, but only half (50%) of the public credits charities with making the appropriate information available. (www.give.org)
The Wise Giving Alliance study indicates that half of the donors surveyed are aware of selective information sharing on the part of nonprofits (whether through purposeful neglect or some more benign reason such as lack of understanding of reporting requirements) and also that organizations are the preferred source of gathering information, a definite conflict and potential source of frustration for donors. Understanding this, the nonprofit watchdog organization Ministry Watch has a special transparency rating that relates how difficult it is to obtain information from the organization, a rating that recognizes that some organizations purposefully withhold information to maintain an advantage over potential donors.
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A donor will possess varying amounts of information with regard to an organization he or she is considering supporting. Most likely, high-end prospects, those with the capacity to make a major gift to a nonprofit, will receive the most attention from an organization and therefore will have more information than donors who are solicited at a lower dollar amount. If this holds true, donors in the higher prospect categories will be well informed with organizations providing less information to donors expected to make a smaller donation. From the donor's perspective, someone who is not making a major contribution is not making as large of a financial investment in the organization and will therefore have less interest in learning a great deal about its accountability practices. Although the current data do not allow for analysis of the size of individual donations, from a theoretical perspective, we would expect high-capacity donors to be most affected by ratings because a larger investment constitutes more information gathering; however, ratings would also affect highly motivated donors with lower capacity who actively seek information.
Although the ratings systems are intended to alleviate the problem of incomplete information and information asymmetry, at least from the donor perspective, this study seeks to determine whether or not they accomplish this goal. To test the effect of such ratings on donor behavior, the discussion needs to be placed within the theoretical context of information asymmetry, which leads to three possible hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: An unknown rating will not affect donations, either positively or negatively. Hypothesis 2: A known "pass" rating will increase donations to an organization. Hypothesis 3: A known "did not pass" rating will decrease donations to an organization.
Data
To estimate the effect of accountability ratings on the amount of contributions an organization receives, this study focuses on the Wise Giving Alliance ratings for organizations in New York State with an emphasis on New York City. The model incorporates the variables as described in Table 1 , including total contributions, rating, total revenue, fund-raising expense, and organization type from a group of 683 New York 501(c)(3) organizations.
The Wise Giving Alliance rating is conferred on an organization after the BBB has assessed the organization relative to the categories of Governance & Oversight, Measuring Effectiveness, Finances, and Fundraising & Informational Materials. (See the appendix for a complete description of each BBB criterion.) In 2005, more than 2.2 million charity reports were viewed online through this service (www .give.org). A print version of the New York State Wise Giving Guide is also available and provided the ratings for this study. Because the Wise Giving Alliance cannot feasibly rate every nonprofit organization, one limitation of this process is that rated organizations are selected for assessment in response to a consumer/donor request outside of the BBB or a contact from someone within an organization that wishes to be rated. In this environment, consumer contacts receive priority and the BBB has a policy of giving assessment priority to those organizations that are larger and/or receive the most consumer requests for ratings. As a result, larger organizations with higher revenues are more likely to be rated than smaller, less well-known organizations. The sum of these processes means that the Wise Giving Alliance can only assess a small portion of the total nonprofit population within the state.
The data for the New York State organizations' contributions, total revenue, fundraising, and NTEE classification are found in the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 990 data for the years 2000 and 2001 located on the IRS Web site. These data sets contain information from the IRS Form 990, which nonprofit organizations having total revenues greater than $25,000 are required to file annually. Limitations on the 990 data exist because (a) only organizations required to do so file the reports so that many small organizations are omitted, and (b) the reporting is self-disclosed. According to the National Center for Charitable Statistics (2006) , approximately two thirds of organizations registered as nonprofits do not file 990s.
Furthermore, research indicates that nonprofits egregiously underreport fund-raising expenses on Form 990 (Hager, 2003; Hager, Rooney, & Pollak, 2002; Krishman, Table 4 Yetman, & Yetman, 2006; Tuckman & Chang, 1998) , which warrants caution when interpreting results on the fund-raising variable. The fund-raising variable is a composite of any professional fund-raising fees, special events expenses, and total internal fund-raising expenses as reported by the organization.
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Total revenue for each organization was used as a measure of the scale of the organization under the assumption that larger organizations would have the human resources capacity to garner additional resources through fund-raising activities. The contribution variable is taken from the Form 990 gifts, grants, and contributions line.
The National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE) developed by the National Center for Charitable Statistics provides a classification system for organizations based on organizations' self-described, primary purpose as revealed to the IRS (Lampkin, Romeo, & Finnin, 2001 ). These classifications are expressed in categories ranging from 10 to approximately 400 stratifications, depending on the level of specificity required. Although some organizations serve more than one purpose, the NTEE code demonstrates the primary purpose of the organization; a drawback of these data is their inability to reflect multiple missions. The NTEE Major Group code was selected for this project because it contains 26 classification codes, enough to provide ample variation of the data without overconstraining the results. Because the data are cross-sectional instead of panel, the year is included as a dummy variable to determine whether the year of data collection had an effect on the model. The original data sets contain organizations from all 50 U.S. states; therefore, New York organizations were extracted from the whole. First, any organization that did not contain information in the total revenue category was extracted from the list through a process of selective deletion. The remaining New York organizations were then matched with their corresponding BBB rating according to the 1999 and 2000 ratings published in the Wise Giving Guide. The 1999 ratings were matched with financial data from 2000, and the 2000 ratings were matched with financial data from 2001 with the understanding that organizations would reap the benefit of a good rating or detriment of a poor rating in the following giving year. This lagged variable effectively deals with any endogeneity between prior year giving and other potential endogeneity problems.
One hundred forty-six organizations in the abbreviated New York State nonprofit list had a corresponding BBB rating, and 537 organizations in New York that did not have a BBB rating were randomly selected from the remaining organizations to serve as a base of comparison, for a total sample of 683 organizations. Of those organizations assessed by the Wise Giving Alliance, 66% had a pass rating, 17% were listed in the Giving Guide with no rating given, and 16.3% received a mark of undetermined.
9 From the 1999 and 2000 Wise Giving Guide, several organizations were given a rating for which IRS data were not available and were subsequently omitted from the regression. Tables 2 through 4 contain descriptive statistics for the variables of both the rated and unrated portions of the data.
Model and Results
The model asserts that contributions are a function of the rating, total revenue, fund-raising, year, and NTEE classification for each organization, or Contributions = f(Rating, Total Revenue, Fund-raising, Year, and NTEE Classification) The effect of the rating was estimated using OLS (ordinary least squares) regression, and the Wald test determined that all explanatory variables were significant to the model. The BBB pass rating, total revenue, and fund-raising variables have a statistically significant effect on the contributions received by an organization after controlling for fixed effects of organization type, year, and rating. Heteroskedasticity was controlled for because it can be expected that contributions and revenue would associate at a nonconstant rate. All ratings coefficients held the expected signs, except the no pass rating, with pass ratings associated with an increase in giving.
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Applying the one-tailed test to the ratings coefficients, which is consistent with Hypotheses 2 and 3, still does not cause the did not pass coefficients to fall within the 90% confidence level. Although the pass rating is significant, the did not pass rating and undetermined rating are not significant. This finding supports Hypothesis 1, which states that where information is not known, ratings will not affect contributions, and Hypothesis 2, which states that when ratings are known, a positive rating will result in increased contributions. The findings do not support Hypothesis 3, which posits that a known did not pass rating will result in a decrease in donations, thus indicating the impact of information asymmetry on donor behavior. This story can be explained because organizations would happily report a positive rating but tend to hold back a negative rating from public exposure, when possible. Organizations receiving pass ratings from the Wise Giving Alliance are allowed to publish such information and can elect to use the Wise Giving Alliance logo in publications, 12 practices that increase the visibility of a pass rating. Therefore, positive ratings are much more likely to be known than negative ratings. In the latter case, a donor or potential donor would need to search the Wise Giving Alliance database directly for the charity's negative rating to be known.
The coefficient on the rated variable indicates that a BBB pass rating translates into approximately $75,000 more in increased donations to an organization. The total revenue coefficient demonstrates that for every $1,000 in total revenues, an organization will receive approximately $71 in contributions. In terms of organization type, there is no statistical difference between the sectors except for youth development Sloan / Nonprofit Accountability Ratings 9 charities and philanthropy, and volunteerism and grantmaking foundations. As anticipated, the fund-raising variable (which is problematic for reasons mentioned earlier) is highly significant to the model, indicating that for every $1,000 spent on fund-raising, an organization receives $4,766 in contributions. Table 5 demonstrates the regression results for the spectrum of variables included.
Conclusion
This study is significant for academics as well as practitioners who are monitoring time and money spent on accountability issues. Within the constraints of the data, the study estimates that positive accountability ratings increase donors' contributions to a nonprofit; however, it does not explain why negative ratings do not matter to donors. Negative ratings could be ineffective for several reasons, including the following: (a) Donors and/or potential donors do not know about the ratings given to organizations (the information asymmetry argument), (b) donors and/or potential donors do not care about the ratings because their giving is based in other considerations, such as emotional attachment to a cause, (c) donors and/or potential donors do not attach credence to ratings that evolve from a system of self-regulation, or (d) donors and/or potential donors who are informed about a particular charity may be aware of extenuating circumstances that resulted in a negative rating. For example, in the latter case, a board member may know that a nonprofit was rated poorly due to its board meeting once a year instead of the recommended three times.
Even though this study indicates that a known Wise Giving Alliance pass rating increases positive financial returns for nonprofits, information asymmetry is not completely removed by ratings, even when known. Because of the complex nature of nonprofits as well as the variability in ratings systems, the possibility exists that ratings may be misunderstood, "misinterpreted," or "misused" (National Council of Nonprofit Associations and National Human Services Assembly, 2005). To be truly well informed, donors may need to invest additional time and energy into researching an organization, so that after discovering an organization's rating, they may understand the rating's full significance before making the decision to give to the organization.
If self-regulatory measures, such as ratings provided by watchdog groups, fail to reproach negative practices in the nonprofit sector, the threat of greater government regulation gathers strength (Moore, 2001) . Although more than 100 organizations and/or agencies provide accountability frameworks including best practices in general management and the disclosure of information to the public and organizations embrace accountability practices, there are few sanctions for noncompliance outside of donor influence or governmental intervention. Evelyn Brody (2001) determines that donors themselves bear the primary responsibility to hold nonprofits to strict accountability standards; however, this study implies that information asymmetry may prevent donors from obtaining and interpreting ratings from watchdog groups to their full advantage. If watchdog organizations can increase the visibility of their ratings systems, perhaps negative ratings as well as positive ones will begin to affect an organization's contributions, resulting in greater accountability across the sector.
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Appendix Better Business Bureau (BBB) Rating Criteria

Criterion
Criterion Description
Governance & oversight a board of directors that provides adequate oversight of the charity's operations and its staff a board of directors with a minimum of five voting members a minimum of three evenly spaced meetings per year of the full governing body with a majority in attendance, with face-to-face participation not more than one or 10% (whichever is greater) directly or indirectly compensated person(s) serving as voting member(s) of the board; compensated members shall not serve as the board's chair or treasurer no transaction(s) in which any board or staff members have material conflicting interests with the charity resulting from any relationship or business affiliation Measuring effectiveness have a board policy of assessing, no less than every 2 years, the organization's performance and effectiveness and of determining future actions required to achieve its mission submit to the organization's governing body, for its approval, a written report that outlines the results of the aforementioned performance and effectiveness assessment and recommendations for future actions Finances spend at least 65% of its total expenses on program activities spend no more than 35% of related contributions on fund-raising avoid accumulating funds that could be used for current program activities; to meet this standard, the charity's unrestricted net assets available for use should not be more than three times the size of the past year's expenses or three times the size of the current year's budget, whichever is more make available to all, on request, complete annual financial statements prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles include in the financial statements a breakdown of expenses (e.g., salaries, travel, postage, etc.) that shows what portion of these expenses was allocated to program, fund-raising, and administrative activities accurately report the charity's expenses, including any joint cost allocations, in its financial statements have a board-approved annual budget for its current fiscal year, outlining projected expenses for major program activities, fundraising, and administration Fund-raising and have solicitations and informational materials, distributed by any informational materials means, that are accurate, truthful, and not misleading, both in whole and in part have an annual report available to all, on request, that includes (continued)
